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Abstract 
Changes in family systems that have occurred over the past half century throughout the Western 
world are now spreading across the globe to nations that are experiencing economic 
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adapting in different ways to a series of conditions that forced shifts in all Western nations. In 
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Global Family Changes 
I still vividly recall from my graduate student days at Columbia University more than a 
half century ago noted sociologist William J. Goode strutting around the lecture hall complaining 
that we do not have a good general theory about why and how family systems are changing 
globally. Of course, he didn’t use the term “globally” explicitly because the word was not yet in 
fashion. In the mid-1960s, Goode made the theoretical argument that there would be a 
transformation in family systems around the world, from longstanding traditional forms to the 
“conjugal household.” With this term he was suggesting that family systems around the world 
would eventually converge with the Western model of the nuclear family—comprised of a 
married couple and their children in a single household, rather than multigenerational or complex 
households. Goode contended that the conjugal family was most compatible with the growth of 
market capitalism and a job-based economy. Consequently, he speculated that the Western 
system would eventually spread across the globe. Evidence of rapid economic growth and the 
development of a modern economy that have come to be called “globalism” had already moved 
beyond the West in the early post-War era to parts of Asia, just as Goode was completing his 
book World Revolution and Family Patterns (1963), which contained data from 50 countries and 
analyzed the impact of family on societies. 
In what became a classic analysis of change in family systems, Goode (1963) assembled 
a large array of extant data describing recent patterns in a number of the world’s regional family 
systems. He convincingly demonstrated that over time, traditional agricultural-based economies 
and the family systems to which they had given rise were being undermined by the growth of 
job-based economies and the spread of Western ideas. At the same time, family patterns that had 
been in place around the globe were yielding to more Western-style practices such as the 
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growing expectation of strong marital bonds, lower fertility, and fewer intergenerational 
households. 
Goode (1963) argued that the Western family system had changed to fit (adapt to) an 
economy that increasingly required more education and geographical mobility. These changes in 
turn would erode the authority of family elders and reduce their formal control over their 
children, he asserted. Modern family systems in the West, he predicted, would initiate free mate 
choice based on compatibility and sentiment rather than on family interests or parental control. 
Finally, he showed that these modern features of Western family systems were being adopted in 
many regions of the world in the aftermath of the World War II. 
Had Goode (1963) been able to imagine the revolution in gender roles that was also just 
on the horizon, he might have pointed to it as another major change in family systems. However, 
he was largely unable to foresee the events of the next several decades whereby the gender-based 
division of labor still observed in the West in the 1960s would give way to a growing demand for 
gender equality, although he hinted at this possibility (see Cherlin, 2012; Furstenberg, 2013). 
More recently, some theorists have examined the weakening of gender stratification as an 
independent source of family adaptation to economic growth (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Esping-
Andersen & Billari, 2015; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, & Lappegard, 2015; McDonald, 2000). 
Nonetheless, Goode’s masterwork (1963) influenced the writing of the next generation of 
sociologists and demographers who studied global and regional patterns of change in family 
systems. Although his theoretical perspective included the possibility that ideational change (i.e., 
a shift in cultural values) might precede or follow structural changes in family systems, a number 
of theorists, in response, emphasized and even prioritized the importance of value change 
through social diffusion (e.g., see Coale & Watkins, 1986; Hendi, 2017; Johnson-Hanks et al., 
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2011; Watkins, 1990) Just as Max Weber (1905) argued in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism more than a century earlier, these theorists have argued that culture is an independent 
influence on changing preferences for individual choice, a value set that is often seen as an 
export from the West. However, researchers—Caldwell, 1976; Inglehart, 1990; Lesthaeghe and 
Surkyn, 1988; Thornton, 2001; Van de Kaa, 1987; among others—have challenged the 
underlying assumption of economic determinism that they saw in Goode’s theory. 
In a book on changing family systems titled Between Sex and Power: Family in the 
World—in some sense a sequel to Goode’s (1963) book from 40 years earlier—Therborn (2004) 
argued for the separate influence of law and public policy as an independent institutional driver 
of change both in the developed and developing worlds. Others have pointed to the potentially 
causal influence of changing demographic pressures owing to declines in mortality and fertility 
that prompted changes in the timing of life events such as marriage and childbearing ages 
(Bianchi, 2014; Bongaarts, 2015; Bongaarts, Mensch, & Blanc, 2017; Hertrich, 2017). Along the 
same line, reproductive technology has brought about new possibilities in the timing and 
organization of the life course, indicating that technology can also have an independent influence 
on change in family patterns (Golombok et al. 1995; Inhorn, Birenbaum, & Carneli, 2008). 
These broad theories of why and how family systems change have stimulated a sizeable 
body of national and regional studies on patterns of family change throughout the world 
(Allendorf & Pandian, 2016; Amador, 2016; Cuesta, Rios-Salas, & Meyer, 2017; Kumagai, 
2010; Kuo & Raley, 2016; Seltzer, 2004; Seltzer et al., 2005; Thornton et al., 2014; etc.). Yet, it 
is still fair to say that since the publication of Goode’s (1993) book more than a half century ago, 
there has been no systematic attempt to test in the broadest sense his theory of how change in 
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family systems occurs or the competing explanations that have been advanced in response to his 
bold predictions using demographic data on a global scale. 
Nonetheless, the idea of a growing convergence in fertility patterns has become a major 
topic of inquiry among demographers and economists (Casterline & National Research Council, 
2001; Coleman, 2002; Crenshaw, Christenson, & Oakey, 2000; Dorius, 2008; Hendi, 2017; 
Rindfuss, Choe, & Brauner-Otto, 2016; Wilson, 2001, 2011). Even taking account of this distinct 
line of research, a broader investigation of how and why family systems change over time, much 
less the systematic testing of Goode’s broad theory and the responses to it, has been stymied by 
the absence of comparable data on global family systems. The availability of such data would 
permit the empirical examination of competing explanations of the transformation of family 
systems in response to economic, cultural, social, demographic, and political change. 
This paper examines some of the issues that must be addressed before family scholars can 
develop and test theoretical explanations for why and how family systems change. I begin by 
enumerating the major changes that have occurred in families across the globe, before 
introducing a conceptual framework for investigating why change is coming about more rapidly 
in some regions of the world than in others. After describing why systems are changing, I turn to 
a particular feature of the change: growing patterns of inequality that are being generated by 
diverging family patterns across social class strata. Finally, I conclude by describing an ongoing 
project through which colleagues and I are assembling extensive and reliable data to study these 
issues. 
Worldwide Changing Family Practices 
 Broadly speaking, it is easy to argue that some degree of convergence in family patterns 
worldwide, as presented below, has already occurred, particularly if the terrain is restricted to 
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marriage and fertility, although researchers have noted continuing evidence of heterogeneity as 
well (Holland, 2017; Pesando & the GFC team, in press). 
1. The age at first marriage has been rising in most nations of the world (Jones & Yeung, 
2014). This pattern was evident in Western Europe and English-speaking countries 
during the latter third of the last century and has continued into the present (Stevenson & 
Wolfers, 2007). It is now evident that similar changes have occurred more recently in 
virtually all countries in Eastern Europe, large areas of East Asia (with some important 
exceptions. such as much of India, China, Indonesia, and Vietnam), and part of Africa 
and Latin America (Bongaarts, Mensch, & Blanc, 2017; García & de Oliveira, 2011; 
Harwood-Lejeune, 2001; Raymo et al., 2015). Although not uniform, the pattern is 
sufficiently widespread to lead most researchers to conclude that the institution of 
marriage is undergoing profound changes in most parts of the world in response to 
economic and social change (Cherlin, 2012). 
2. The rise in the age at first marriage is just one reason for the general decline in fertility 
that has occurred worldwide except in rural Africa and parts of the Middle East 
(Bongaarts, 1978; Casterline, 2017; Madsen, Moslehi, & Wang, 2018). As I have already 
noted, marriage at a later age typically implies less family influence on the choice of 
partner and perhaps a growth in heterogamous unions, at least initially, as individuals 
have more options to form families of their own choosing, including remaining single. 
This pattern has increased in most nations, especially where females have entered the 
labor force in greater numbers (Esteve, Garcia-Roman, & Permanyer, 2012; Harknett & 
Kuperberg, 2012). In some family systems, particularly in the economically advanced 
nations of East Asia, a growing fraction of women seem to be exercising their option to 
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delay marriage indefinitely (Furstenberg, 2013; Jones, 2005; Raymo et al., 2015). As in 
the West, marriage is apparently becoming more discretionary in Eastern Europe and 
parts of Asia (Jones, Hull, & Mohamad, 2011; Thornton & Philipov, 2009). 
3. As marriage has become more optional, the practice of cohabitation (before, after, or in 
lieu of a formal union) has grown throughout the Western world and in Eastern Europe 
(Heuveline & Timberlake, 2004; Holland, 2017; Lundberg, Pollak, & Stearns, 2016; 
Thornton & Philipov, 2009). In many nations in Latin America and the Caribbean, where 
cohabitation has long been a preferred form among certain ethnic and racial minorities, it 
has become more widely practiced among more economically advantaged individuals 
who previously confined their unions to formal marriage (Covre-Sussai et al., 2015; 
Esteve & Lesthaeghe, 2016; Esteve, Lesthaeghe, & Lopez-Gay, 2012; Lesthaeghe, 2014). 
4. Divorce after marriage has become more common in most nations, especially those with 
previously low rates of marital dissolution (Surkyn & Lesthaeghe, 2004). While marital 
stability has increased in some countries among the most educated, it has declined at the 
same time for the less educated and skilled portion of the population (Schwartz & Han, 
2014). As marriage has moved to a more companionate form, divorce is increasingly 
viewed as an acceptable option for couples in unsatisfactory relationships (Goode, 1963; 
Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2004). 
5. A concomitant trend is the growth of childlessness in families in most wealthy nations, 
which is associated with declining fertility (Kreyenfeld & Konietzka, 2017; Rowland, 
2007). In a growing number of nations in Europe, the English-speaking nations, and the 
advanced economies of Asia such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, substantial proportions 
of women are electing not to have children (and often not to marry (Jones, 2007). Living 
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alone has become more common in many countries of the world as growing numbers of 
females have entered the labor force and opted not to marry (Jones, 2005).  Childlessness 
appears to be on the rise in East Asia and other rapidly developing parts of the globe. 
6. The rapid growth of women’s participation in the labor force in most developing and 
almost all developed nations has been accompanied by a change in men and women’s 
domestic roles (Goldscheider, Bernhardt, & Lappegard, 2015; McDonald, 2000). In many 
nations, the ideology of gender equality may have grown faster than its actual practice. 
Nonetheless, throughout the developing and developed world, a push for women’s rights 
has meant that females now have far more access to education and labor market 
participation in the 21st Century (Duflo, 2012; Goldin, 2006). And, this trend is only 
likely to increase as women’s rights are enforced by changes in legal statutes and public 
policies. Moreover, spousal beating and sexual coercion have been identified as serious 
problems in countries that at one time legitimized these practices (Yount, 2009). 
7. The weakening of the institution of marriage has been accompanied by a growing 
tolerance for premarital sexual behavior and out-of-wedlock childbearing (Thornton & 
Young-DeMarco, 2004). Although much of the non-marital childbearing is occurring 
within informal unions, the stability of non-marital unions with children is lower than 
marital unions with children (Manning, Smock, & Majumdar, 2004). This particular trend 
may be contributing to the growing stratification in family systems between the 
advantaged and disadvantaged. The privileged are more likely to marry and have children 
after marriage, whereas those less well-off are having them before or outside of marriage, 
contributing to a perpetual economic and social disadvantage (Kalil, 2015; Lundberg, 
Pollak, & Stearns, 2016; McLanahan, 2004). It is worth noting that in parts of the 
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developing world, the pattern of consensual marriages has long existed, particularly in 
Latin America and the West Indies (Esteve & Lesthaeghe, 2016). 
8. The stratification of family systems is both a cause and consequence of rising levels of 
inequality in most nations with advanced economies, and introduces profound differences 
in children’s opportunities. Among the educated, children are more often the products of 
intense investment; less educated parents often lack both the resources and the skills to 
prepare their children for a more demanding educational system in order to acquire the 
knowledge and skills needed today (Dronkens, Kalmijn & Wagner, 2006; Schneider, 
Hastings, & LaBriola, 2018). In all likelihood this pattern is appearing in developing 
nations (Kalil, 2015; Pesando & the GFC team, in press). 
9. Although preferences for intergenerational arrangements continue to prevail in some 
parts of the world, individuals forming families are increasingly less likely to reside in 
conjoint and complex households (Ruggles & Heggeness, 2008). The decline of 
intergenerational households in some nations may also reflect the declining influence of 
the older generation; in at least some of these nations, there is concern that the elderly 
may lack traditional family support in later life (Grundy, 2006; Taylor et al., 2018). 
These trends in marriage and family do not generally occur singly as family systems 
change from agricultural-based to industrial- and post-industrial based economies. They typically 
evolve as interrelated changes that co-occur over time, although not necessarily in a predictable 
or orderly sequence of adaptations to exogenous changes in the economy, polity, technological 
advances, and alterations in the culture of a society. Demographers have referred to these related 
features as the second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe, 2010, 2014; McLanahan, 2004). By 
this they mean that family systems have become more governed by members’ individual 
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preferences than by elders (especially males) who once assumed considerable authority to 
impose their will on the family as a collective system. As Therborn (2004) argued, the decline of 
patriarchy appears to be at the core of family system change, although it cannot be considered a 
cause of it in the strictest sense of the word. More accurately, as I assert in the next section, the 
changes are brought about by a host of factors that work in tandem to undermine the existing 
order that is often based on patriarchal expectations. 
Why Change Occurs in Family Systems 
The transformation of family systems in many regions of the world and in particular 
nations has been amply documented by demographers, sociologists, and economists cited earlier 
according to some of the trends just described, but this transformation has not been explained in 
a strict sense. It is clear that the development of a job-based economy is one of the central 
sources of change, much as Goode (1963) claimed a half century ago. However, economic 
development does not take place in isolation from broader societal changes, that is, institutional 
changes in education, health, law, and the spread of technology alter existing institutions and 
longstanding cultural assumptions (Meyer et al., 1975). 
To illustrate, I have borrowed a conceptual scheme that depicts some of the sources of 
social change from an ongoing research project funded by the National Science Foundation 
(NSF) that is designed to examine this process in family systems across the globe and is being 
carried out by a team of scholars at the University of Pennsylvania, including Hans-Peter Kohler 
(Project Head), Luca Maria Pesando, Andres Castro, and collaborators in several European 
nations (see http://web.sas.upenn.edu/gfc; Pesando & the GFC team, in press). Using data from 
the worldwide Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), the Global Family Change (GFC) 
Project has extracted indicators of family change to identify patterns of change in low- and 
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middle-income countries and test the processes by which family system change occurs (see 
Figure 1). 
In this research project, my colleagues and I make a fundamental assumption that 
alterations in family patterns can arise from societal adaptations to a number of different 
exogenous sources introduced into a society through parallel and often complementary 
processes. Change in family systems often comes about when transformations in macro-level 
conditions occur; the most important of these being the transition from a predominately 
traditional subsistence economy to a production-oriented economy transformed by its capacity to 
provide exports to agro-business, manufacturing, and industry. This transformation, much as 
Goode (1963) argued, creates or expands a job-based economy that favors younger and more 
geographically mobile individuals, including young and typically unmarried women. Economic 
development is typically centered in urban areas, implying a shift from a rural to an urban 
population, bringing about a loss of family control, especially when young people in cities often 
continue to support their kin financially in the countryside. 
Such economic developments do not invariably go hand in hand with shifts in cultural 
expectations and practices, but it is not uncommon to see, especially among the young, a 
reorientation to more individually-determined lifestyles and a decline in social control by elders, 
and especially in men’s control of women (Cherlin, 2012). Quite independently, economic 
development introduces new technologies (Greenwood, 2019). The rapid spread of the use of 
computers and smart phones has stimulated a growth in the use of social media in developing 
nations, a powerful influence on younger persons who have quickly adopted these new forms of 
communication (Pew Research Center, 2018). So, exposure to social influences begins to extend 
well beyond the family, village institutions, or even national political sources of opinion. 
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Inevitably, peer-mediated contexts begin to hold more weight on public opinion, and the 
extended family system loses influence accordingly (Allendorf, 2016; Bongaarts & Watkins, 
1996; Cherlin, 2012). 
Accompanying and preceding economic development also come alterations in existing 
political, social, and even religious institutions. The educational system becomes both a channel 
of mobility and in many nations a new way that families can maintain or achieve advantage if 
they choose to invest in their children’s long-term futures through schooling. The importance of 
schooling grows as it extends from primary to secondary institutions, and ultimately to tertiary 
education for the affluent and the talented. Education itself often presents a powerful 
counterweight to traditional practices both inside and outside the home, upsetting longstanding 
cultural understandings. For women, whose presence in secondary and tertiary education has 
grown to a majority in many countries, the impact of additional schooling can be transformative, 
eroding traditional gender norms and giving economic advantages to more educated women 
(Esteve, Garcia-Roman, & Permanyer, 2012; Schwartz & Han, 2014). 
In the polity and the public sphere, shifts in the opinions of economic and political elites 
often must take account of the changed economic status of women that comes with education 
and greater involvement in the labor market. Relatively little is known about the timing of broad 
institutional changes that bring about women’s greater involvement in the polity. And, lacking 
systematic data, little is known about how gender involvement in education and work plays out 
inside the family. Alternatively, changes within family systems may occur in response to cultural 
ideas about equality that travel through different routes such as mass and social media or come 
about because of legal or policy changes. Political leaders advocate and adopt new policies that 
often are imported from rich nations or more economically developed neighbors in the region 
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(Meyer, 1975; Watkins, 2001). New ideas and practices may be imported, but they are typically 
modified to suit the institutional structures in place and mediated by national traditions and 
culture that tailor and shape them to conform to existing cultural forms.  New policy dilemmas 
arise in the process of economic development, with the dissemination of new forms of 
technology, and the spread of cultural ideas and information.  Invariably, certain countries must 
support or ban new reproductive technologies, the content of Western movies and social media, 
and laws regulating same-sex marriage. Thus, disagreements over public policies related to these 
practices and issues can happen rapidly, and we suspect independently, of the level and pace of 
economic development. 
It is wrong to assume that the process of economic and social development works 
invariably from the top down, with those having more education or resources always adopting 
new family patterns sooner than the rest of the population, but this flow from the well off to the 
less privileged often occurs (Pesando & the GFC team, in press). Changes can simultaneously 
occur at the macro, mezzo, and micro levels; values can and do change as individuals move from 
the countryside to the city, or leave their home countries to find work elsewhere (Hu, 2016). 
Increases in migration to and from other nations are undoubtedly a source of new information, 
values, and daily practices. Ideas are promulgated through channels of mass and social media 
that promote educational advancement, individual fulfillment, or gender equality, undermining 
traditional family patterns sometimes even in nations that are lagging in economic advancement. 
At the individual level, change occurs as people confront new and unfamiliar situations as 
they occur or, at least, are imaginable (such as going to a university, engaging in sex before 
marriage, or migrating to another country for employment). As Mills (1959) observed decades 
ago in The Sociological Imagination, cultural contradictions emerge in all societies experiencing 
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change, that compel individuals to adopt new ways of thinking and new forms of behavior. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the change that occurs within family systems as older 
practices no longer seem to have the same cultural grip that they once had. One only has to think 
about how many people have begun to eschew formal marriage today in the West, adopting 
social practices such as cohabitation or single parenthood or gay marriage, that were socially 
unacceptable, even unthinkable, a half century ago (Biblarz & Savci, 2010; Moore & Stambolis-
Ruhstorfer, 2013). 
In sum, social change is an organic and systemic process that permeates a society and its 
existing institutions. And at the micro-level of individuals and families, it is received or resisted 
by the powerful and powerless alike. It will not take precisely the same form in all nations 
because it is mediated by a nation’s historical experience, its cultural priorities, and existing 
institutional arrangements (Cook & Furstenberg, 2002). Thus, the process of change will vary, 
producing both similar and dissimilar responses, depending on existing political/historical 
experience, cultural, and social arrangements. This is why Billari and Liefbroer (2010) asserted 
that there can be a convergence to divergence when describing patterns of family change. 
Where and When Changes in Family Systems Occur 
It should be evident from my previous descriptions of the complex and variegated nature 
of how changes in family systems occur that new patterns and practices are adopted unevenly 
both across and within various nations.  A major reason why the pattern of change is not uniform 
is that exposure to both economic and cultural changes differs depending on the specific social 
contexts in which individuals and their families are embedded. Think, for example, of the vast 
differences in exposure to these changes that living in a capital city of a developing nation versus 
in a remote area might mean. This is aptly illustrated by the changes in attitude about marriage 
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now occurring in Vietnam where attitudes about marriage timing, cohabitation, and premarital 
sex differ widely from countryside to urban environments (Minh & Hong, 2015). 
A second source of variability in family system changes is that receptivity to new ideas or 
practices will vary depending on such factors as age, gender, education, ethnic and religious 
affiliations, and a host of other conditions. For example, adoption of new methods of 
contraception, say by young unmarried women, can be a sensitive indicator of what might be 
called a predisposition to modernity when the logic of having large numbers of children becomes 
questionable for some in a society but not for others. As I have already noted, there are powerful 
differences in the stakes of adopting new practices that threaten to undermine the way things 
have long been done in any developing nation. Any adequate theory purporting to explain family 
system change must account not only for the total change but also for the variable levels of 
change within a nation. 
Historians of family change in the West have made this point repeatedly in noting that 
change is uneven in any given nation. Such was the case with Protestants in England during the 
16th century who were more open to changing childrearing practices to emphasize a child’s 
relationship to God than were Catholics (Stone, 1977). The upper classes also adopted new and 
different ideas concerning childrearing, owing to religious ideology and education than did the 
rest of the population. Several centuries ago in Western Europe and the United States, urban 
residents and young people in general were more receptive to growing preferences for 
individualism and the rise of sentiment in family relationships than were their rural and older 
counterparts (Shorter, 1977). Similarly, in the developing world today, some groups will be more 
welcoming of certain new practices than others, depending on the degree to which they are 
embedded in certain institutional contexts that reinforce a commitment to existing family 
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patterns. Any adequate theory of family change must account for both where it takes hold and 
how its spreads within nations. The analysis of big data generated by patterns of media use, for 
example, is potentially an attractive source of information for investigating how change runs 
through established and new social networks in the developing world. 
In early stages of economic and social development, increasing variability in family 
behaviors within a developing nation is to be expected as new family patterns such as premarital 
sexual behavior and marriage delay are adopted unevenly, let’s say between rural and urban 
areas, the more and less educated, or, for example, among some ethnic groups and not others. 
Over time, this variability may decline as practices become more widely accepted and diffused. 
But note how differences in family patterns may also persist for long periods of time. One only 
has to think about how enduring differences have been observed in Europe between the Northern 
and Southern nations (Perelli-Harris, 2014), or the continuing variation between family patterns 
such as cohabitation, family size, or the prevalence of intergenerational households in Northern 
and Southern Italy (Gabrielli & Hoem, 2010). 
Economic Inequality and Family Systems 
Adaptation to macro-level changes in the economy or mezzo-level changes that occur 
within institutions creates new winners and losers in the developing world, as has happened in 
the past in nations with advanced economies (see www.welfare.org). I have argued elsewhere 
that an interaction is occurring between changing family systems and growing economic 
inequality, which has been a trend in virtually all post-industrial economies and many rapidly 
developing nations (Furstenberg, 2011, 2013). It is not difficult to imagine why and how family 
change is amplified by economic divergence and vice versa. For example, educational attainment 
can be assumed to weigh more heavily on outcomes in economies that utilize advanced skills and 
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knowledge; access to education, especially higher education, may in turn affect the process of 
family change (Esping-Anderson, 2016). 
In the United States and many nations in Europe, destinies among the well off and the not 
so well off began to diverge in the latter decades of the 20th century as the nuclear family became 
increasingly important as both an agency of socialization and parental management of children 
(McLanahan, 2004). Family forms, such as whether parents marry or even reside together at the 
time of birth, birthing procedures, maternal health, breastfeeding, styles of parenting, and 
different abilities of families to manage and place their children in contexts that promote (or 
diminish) opportunity have new and perhaps more lasting effects than they might have had in the 
past. Parents’ influence on school performance appears to be growing in societies where 
educational attainment has become a more important criterion for success in later life. In rich 
nations, poorer families and middle-income families have begun to fall behind their wealthier 
counterparts in promoting their children’s level of schooling (Lareau, 2011). Children receiving 
less intense socialization and particularly preparation for schooling may have fewer potential 
paths in life than their more educated counterparts to make it into the middle class. 
Nations substantially differ in their commitments to reducing the disparities created in 
advanced economies through the redistribution of public resources and development of policies 
that attempt to reduce and offset the powerful early influences on children’s development that are 
associated with lower social class position. Limited efforts by some nations, such as the United 
States, to mitigate the potent effects of family patterns of socialization have created substantial 
gaps in children’s life chances (Smeeding, 2006), which is an evitable result of the great 
differences in resources and the capabilities of parents in many contemporary societies to place 
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their children in settings that will provide them with the skills and training to enter and succeed 
in school. 
The evidence that social class disparities in family systems are growing globally has not 
been established despite the fact that inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, has grown 
in all but a few nations over the past several decades (Bowles, Gintis, & Groves, 2008). And 
there are indications of shifts in family practices, such as marriage and non-marital childbearing, 
that may be diverging at the top and bottom of the socioeconomic ladder in some Western 
nations, most notably the United States (Cherlin, 2010; Lundberg, Pollak, & Stearns, 2016; 
McLanahan, 2004). However, this divergence in family patterns is also evident in some 
European nations and may be appearing in certain rapidly developing countries in East Asia 
(Bernardi & Boertien, 2017; Harkonen, 2017). 
 Although certainly occurring elsewhere, evidence for a widening of social class in family 
behaviors is most apparent in the United States, where over the past 30 years or more, Americans 
have lost ground in creating conditions that ensure equality of opportunity—an ideal that 
Americans have long believed is essential to maintaining a just society (Chetty et al., 2014; 
Corak, 2013). Class differences in family patterns have widened on a variety of fronts even as 
family variations among racial and ethnic groups have shrunk (Reardon, 2011). In fact, I would 
contend that Americans now have a two-tiered family system—a system where family patterns 
among rich and poor have begun to diverge even more sharply than they did a half century ago 
when sociologists first documented considerable variation (Furstenberg, 2013). 
At the bottom and increasingly in the middle of U.S. income distribution, marriage is 
occurring less often before the transition to parenthood (Lundberg, Pollak, & Stearns, 2016). 
Many births are less likely to be planned and often occur in ephemeral partnerships; a growing 
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number of lower-income couples are having children from more than one union, a pattern that 
has come to be known as multi-partnered childbearing (Fomby & Osborne, 2017; Guzzo, 2014). 
This emerging trend of couples having children in two or more unions means that parents, fathers 
in particular, are dividing their investments of time, money, and emotion among their children in 
multiple households, and many are growing up in households where fathers (and less often 
mothers) come and go (Thomson, 2014). 
Of course, certain benefits could be gained when children can rely on several parent 
figures, but they are only likely to occur when the parents are deeply invested (spend time, 
money, and emotion) in the lives of both their biological and non-biological offspring (Akashi-
Ronquest, 2009; Henretta, Van Voorhis, & Soldo, 2014). Evidence suggests that fathers in these 
circumstances often lack the resources to meet their parental obligations even if they have the 
desire to do so (Berger, Cancian, & Meyer, 2012). Presently, little is known about the enduring 
commitments of parents who do not reside with their biological children and the behaviors of 
surrogate parents who replace them in the household (Carlson & Furstenberg, 2006; Hans & 
Coleman, 2009). However, most of what is known about the importance of stability, stimulation, 
and emotional bonds in early life suggests that children’s development may be compromised in 
conditions where there is a high family flux arising from the absence or replacement of 
biological parents (Fomby & Cherlin, 2007). 
Beyond the form of the family and parenting processes in early life, parents’ ability to 
channel resources to their children matters both early and later in life. Support by extended 
family members can sometimes help to mitigate the absence of parental resources. However, 
research on the flow of intergenerational resources suggests that children from privileged 
families provide far more assistance to their children and grandchildren than occurs in poor 
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families where resources are in short supply. Indeed, the gap between rich and poor children 
grows in part because wealthier grandparents are better positioned to help out by providing 
housing assistance and child support when needed (Albertini, Kohli & Vojel, 2007). 
A host of advantages for children are strongly associated with adequate income and 
education. Just to mention a few, children in privileged families (those whose parents have a 
college education) live in more desirable neighborhoods with better schools, libraries, and 
recreation facilities, and in these preferred contexts, they are more likely to have supervised peer 
relationships with children of other privileged families in preschool and afterschool programs or 
during the summer (Lareau, 2011; Minh et al., 2017; Schneider, Hastings, & LaBriola, 2018). 
Lower-income parents cannot afford these amenities unless the programs are publically funded 
or subsidized, which for the most part does not happen in most low-income communities in the 
United States (Esping-Andersen, 2016). 
Thus, it is not surprising to discover that substantial differences exist between the better 
off and less well off in preparation for schooling, and that these initial differences only widen 
over time because many children enter school systems that are ill-equipped to compensate for the 
disadvantages of growing up poor (Alexander et al., 2014). A large body of research has 
documented how stratification in family practices is creating trajectories of disadvantage in 
middle and later childhood, during adolescence, and, more recently in early adulthood 
(Furstenberg, 2011). 
The reverse image of this cycle of disadvantage occurs when children are born into well-
off families in American society. Even before birth, the situations of advantaged families have 
sharp, positive differences at birth. Childbearing is highly likely to occur within a marital union, 
where the relationship has often been time-tested (Upchurch, Lillard, & Panis, 2002). Not 
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infrequently, the partners have been cohabitating and enter marriage because they are ready to 
have children (Sassler & Miller, 2011). Women in higher income groups receive prenatal care 
more often (Osterman & Martin, 2018); they are less likely to smoke, drink to excess, and more 
often adhere to healthy diets (Furstenberg, 2010; Pampel, Denney, & Krueger, 2011). Thus, 
children born into privileged families enter life in better health and with parents who are well 
prepared to keep them healthy and thriving. Their homes and neighborhoods are safer so that 
children in affluent and educated families are less at risk of having accidents or suffering 
stressful experiences. Moreover, they have better chances of receiving therapeutic interventions 
when negative events do occur (Duncan et al., 1998).  
Parental socialization practices differ sharply by socioeconomic status in ways that also 
favor the better off. A long tradition of research by developmental psychologists and family 
sociologists has shown that better educated and wealthier parents have the resources to instruct 
their children in ways that prepare them to succeed in school (Yamamoto & Sonnenschein, 
2016); moreover, these parents are more confident and skilled in communicating with teachers 
and school personnel when their child is not doing well (Ankrum, 2016). And, they possess the 
social capital to help place their offspring in advantageous educational and cultural settings when 
they are young and when they reach adolescence and early adulthood (Conley, 2001; Lareau, 
2011). 
Research both in the United States and abroad, following the important work of Lareau 
(2011), has identified the “concerted cultivation” provided to children by parents with more 
resources and education. Increasingly, the family has become a “hothouse for development” 
where parents have become ever more alert to strategies to assist their children from the cradle to 
career opportunities. These parents probably deploy more psychological, cultural, and social 
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capital than in earlier eras when there was a more laissez-faire or informal approach to childcare 
and childrearing (Bianchi, 2011).  
The United States is something of an outlier in the West when it comes to public services 
and support for children and families, especially lower-income families. Consequently, the class 
gradient in these families’ behaviors, such as non-marital and single parenthood, unintended 
pregnancies, prenatal care, neonatal services, preschool, and afterschool, may be more 
pronounced than in other English-speaking nations, Europe, and the wealthy nations of Asia. 
Forms of the family and family practices and processes have not yet been well studied in a cross-
national context, much less a global one. However, countries have different tolerances for 
income inequality and different levels of commitment for public services to address social issues, 
particularly their impacts on children. Thus, it remains to be seen how much variation in these 
behaviors by social class exists in different wealthy nations. 
A New Research Frontier 
Despite widespread acknowledgement that family systems are changing rapidly in many 
parts of the world, research to understand the process (how and why change occurs) and the 
direction (adoption of patterns that have become common features of Western systems) of 
change is still in its infancy. There is growing availability of harmonized data sets that include 
many Western and some non-Western nations. Researchers have begun to analyze data from 
studies such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Family 
Database, Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), Generations and 
Gender Surveys (GGS), national birth cohort studies, Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
and its counterparts, Harmonised European Time Use Survey (HETUS), and the International 
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Social Survey Programme (ISSP), among others. However, there are formidable problems to 
examining many of the issues that I have mentioned in this paper. 
Sample sizes are sometimes too small to permit informative analyses, representativeness 
remains an issue in many data sets, the number of countries is rarely large enough to support 
multilevel comparisons, and contextual information on cultural values or public policies is 
absent. The research community has not yet fixed its sights on understanding how change in 
family systems occurs, where change takes place, and what features of culture and social 
structure mediate the direction of change. Most of all, there is a lack information on how public 
policies mitigate some of the consequences of family system change for individuals and 
households. 
The Penn–Oxford Project on Global Family Change (GFC), which is designed to 
examine change on a global scale, is well underway. It utilizes data from more than 100 nations 
by converting national censuses and Demographic and Health Surveys that have been conducted 
over several decades (see www.dhsprogram.com). The aim of the GFC team is to convert the 
sources of information that are cross-sectional into life-course indicators (e.g., whether 
individuals are in school or not at different ages, whether they have married or have had children 
by different ages, and so on) that in turn will permit the GFC team to examine the tempo and 
sequence of family change over time. The GFC team is planning to create macro-level measures 
that can be appended to the various countries for which data exist to develop life-course 
indicators of change (Pesando & the GFC team, in press). This will allow examination of the 
influence, sequence, and order of family changes and the variating macro-level conditions that 
initiate these changes. 
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The attention of the GFC team will be on indicators of changing family patterns in the 
early part of the life course: change in the age of school leaving, home leaving, entrance to full-
time employment, cohabitation, marriage, and first birth. But the team may also examine these 
indicators in combination to understand the sequence of family change such as childbearing 
outside of marriage, years of sexual activity outside of marriage, and the like. The intention is to 
identify associations between macro-level change (i.e., changes in the economy, cultural values, 
and technology) and the emergence of new family forms and changes in the process of family 
formation to examine how, why, and where change is taking place. The team will also be able to 
investigate whether evidence of emerging class differences in family patterns is occurring with 
the growth of inequality. By building a data set that contains macro-level data, evidence on 
changes in public policies, and measures of family change, we will be able to more 
systematically and rigorously test the web of associations suggesting potential chains of causal 
influence in processes that occur in family systems with the rise of new economies, technologies, 
and shifts in cultural priorities and practices. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have explored some of the challenges of examining how and why family 
systems are changing around the globe. I have discussed longstanding disagreements over the 
sources of change and why both convergence and divergence in family systems that are moving 
from agricultural-based to industrial-based economies should be expected. My account builds on 
the theory of the world’s family systems that William J. Goode (1963) proposed over a half 
century ago and that has yet to be subject to vigorous empirical examination. However, plans are 
underway to construct a global database at the University of Pennsylvania containing 
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information that will permit researchers around the globe to map the pace and process of changes 
in family systems, focusing especially on the transition to adult status. 
Throughout the world, the passage to adulthood is generally becoming more protracted 
and more discretionary. As a consequence, elders, especially men in traditional families, will 
lose influence over the direction of their children’s lives and the choices they make. The young 
and females in particular in much of the developing world are increasingly looking to education 
and employment as the means to personal advancement. This process will generally undermine 
family authority, although in its early stages, families are likely to continue to exert influence 
over mate selection in many nations where parental influence on marriage choice has been 
strong. 
These changes are taking place in the context of growing economic inequality that is 
creating considerable divergences in family practices at the top and bottom of the socioeconomic 
distribution. Family systems in many nations with advanced economies are witnessing greater 
stability among the privileged while instability is growing in these same systems among the 
under-privileged. If not counteracted by public policies aimed at mitigating the impact of these 
divergent family practices within societies, a hardening of the stratification system that creates 
ever stronger barriers to social mobility can be expected in the developing world. 
----  
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Esteve, A., Lesthaeghe, R. J., & López-Gay, A. (2012). The Latin American cohabitation boom, 
1970–2007, Population and Development Review, 38, 55–81. 
Fomby, P., & Cherlin, A. J. (2007). Family instability and child well-being. American 
Sociological Review, 72, 181–204. 
Fomby, P., & Osborne, C. (2017). Family instability, multipartner fertility, and behavior in 
middle childhood. Journal of Marriage and Family, 79, 75–93. 
Furstenberg, F. F. (2011). The recent transformation of the American family: Witnessing and 
exploring social change. In M. J. Carlson & P. England (Eds.), Changing families in an 
unequal society (pp. 192–220). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Furstenberg, F. F. (2013). Transitions to adulthood: What we can learn from the West. Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 646, 28–41. 
doi:10.1177/0002716212465811 
Gabrielli, G., & Hoem, J. M. (2010). Italy’s non-negligible cohabitational unions. European 
Journal of Population, 26, 33–46. 
García, B., & de Oliveira, O. (2011). Family changes and public policies in Latin America. 
Annual Review of Sociology, 37, 593–611. 
Goldin, C. (2006). The quiet revolution that transformed women’s employment, education, and 
family. American Economic Review, 96(2), 1–21. 
GLOBAL FAMILY CHANGES 33 
Goldscheider, F., Bernhardt, E., & Lappegard, T. (2015). The gender revolution: A framework 
for understanding changing family and demographic behavior. Population and 
Development Review, 41, 207–239. 
Golombok, S., Cook, R., Bish, A., & Murray, C. (1995). Families created by the new 
reproductive technologies: Quality of parenting and social and emotional development of 
the children. Child Development, 66, 285–298.  
Goode, W. J. (1993). World changes in divorce patterns. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press. 
Greenwood, J. (2019). Evolving households: The imprint of technology on life. Cambridge MA, 
The MIT Press. 
Grundy, E. (2006). Ageing and vulnerable elderly people: European perspectives. Ageing & 
Society, 26, 105–134. 
Guzzo, K. B. (2014). New partners, more kids: Multiple-partner fertility in the United States. 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 654, 66–86. 
doi:10.1177/0002716214525571 
Hans, J. D., & Coleman, M. (2009). The experiences of remarried stepfathers who pay child 
support. Personal Relationships, 16, 597–618. 
Harknett, K., & Kuperberg, A. (2011). Education, labor markets, and the retreat from marriage. 
Social Forces, 90, 41–63. 
Harkonen, J. (2017). Diverging destinies in international perspective: Education, single 
motherhood, and child poverty. LIS Working Paper Series No. 713, Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS), Luxembourg. 
GLOBAL FAMILY CHANGES 34 
Harwood-Lejeune, A. (2001). Rising age at marriage and fertility is Southern and Eastern Africa. 
European Journal of Population, 17, 261–280. 
Hendi, A. (2017). Globalization and contemporary fertility convergence. Social Forces, 96, 215–
238. 
Henretta, J. C., Van Voorhis, M. F., & Soldo, B. J. (2014). Parental money help to children and 
stepchildren. Journal of Family Issues, 35, 1131–1151. 
Hertrich, V. (2017). Trends in age at marriage and the onset of fertility transition in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Population and Development Review, 43(S1), 112–137. 
Heuveline, P., & Timberlake, J. M. (2014). The role of cohabitation in family formation: The 
United States in comparative perspective. Journal of Marriage and Family, 66, 1214–
1230. 
Holland, J. A. (2017). The timing of marriage vis-à-vis coresidence and childbearing in Europe 
and the United States. Demographic Research, 36, 609–626. 
Hu, Y. (2016). Impact of rural-to-urban migration on family and gender values in China. Asian 
Population Studies, 12, 251-272. 
Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture shift in advanced industrial society. Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press. 
Inhorn, M. C., & Birenbaum-Carmeli, D. (2008). Assisted reproductive technologies and Culture 
change. Annual Review of Anthropology, 37, 177–196.  
Johnson-Hanks, J. A., Morgan, S. P., Bachrach, C. A., & Kohler, H. P. (2011) Understanding 
family change and variation: Toward a theory of conjunctural action. New York, NY: 
Springer. 
GLOBAL FAMILY CHANGES 35 
Jones, G. W. (2005). The “flight from marriage” in South-East and East Asia. Journal of 
Comparative Family Studies, 36, 93–119. 
Jones, G. W. (2007). Delayed marriage and very low fertility in Pacific Asia. Population and 
Development Review, 33, 453–478. 
Jones, G. W., Hull, T. H., & Mohamad, M. (2011). Changing marriage patterns in Southeast 
Asia: Economic and socio-cultural dimensions. Menlo Park: Routledge. 
Jones, G. W., & Yeung, W.-J. J. (2014). Marriage in Asia. Journal of Family Issues, 35, 1567–
1583. doi:10.1177/0192513x14538029 
Kalil, A. (2015) Inequality begins at home: The role of parenting in the diverging destinies of 
rich and poor children. In P. Amato, A. Booth, S. McHale, J. Van Hook (Eds.), Families 
in an era of increasing inequality. National Symposium on Family Issues, 5. Springer. 
Kreyenfeld, M., & Konietzka, D. (2017). Childlessness in Europe: Contexts, causes, and 
consequences. Demographic Research Monographs. Springer International Publishing. 
Kumagai, F. (2010). Forty years of family change in Japan: A society experiencing population 
aging and declining fertility. Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 41, 581–610. 
Kuo, J. C., & Raley, R. K. (2016). Diverging patterns of union transition among cohabitors by 
race/ethnicity and education: Trends and marital intentions in the United States. 
Demography, 53, 921–935. 
Lareau, A. (2011). Unequal childhoods: Class, race, and family life (2nd ed.): Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press. 
Lesthaeghe, R. (2014). The second demographic transition: A concise overview of its 
development. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111, 18112–18115. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1420441111 
GLOBAL FAMILY CHANGES 36 
Lesthaeghe, R., & Surkyn, J. (1988). Cultural dynamics and economic theories of fertility 
change. Population and Development Review, 14, 1–45. doi:10.2307/1972499 
Lesthaeghe, R. J. (2010). The unfolding story of the Second Demographic Transition. Population 
and Development Review, 36, 211–251. 
Lundberg, S., Pollak, R. A., & Stearns, J. (2016). Family inequality: Diverging patterns in 
marriage, cohabitation, and childbearing. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30, 79–102. 
Madsen, J. B., Moslehi, S., & Wang, C. (2018). What has driven the great fertility decline in 
developing countries since 1960? The Journal of Development Studies, 54, 738–757. 
Manning, W., Smock, P. J., & Majumdar, D. (2004). The relative stability of cohabiting and 
marital unions for children. Population Research and Policy Review, 23, 135–159. 
McDonald, P. (2000). Gender equity in theories of fertility transition. Population and 
Development Review, 26, 427–439. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2000.00427.x 
McLanahan, S. (2004). Diverging destinies: How children are faring under the second 
demographic transition. Demography, 41, 607–627. doi:10.1353/dem.2004.0033 
Meyer, J. W., Boli-Bennett, J., & Chase-Dunn, C. (1975). Convergence and divergence in 
development. Annual Review of Sociology, 1, 223–246. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.so.01.080175.001255 
Mills, C. W. (1959). The sociological imagination. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Minh, A., Muhajarine, N., Janus, M., Brownell, M., & Guhn, M. (2017). A review of 
neighborhood effects and early child development: How, where, and for whom, do 
neighborhoods matter? Health & Place, 46, 155–174. 
Moore, M. R., & Stambolis-Ruhstorfer, M. (2013). LGBT sexuality and families at the start of 
the twenty-first century. Annual Review of Sociology, 39, 491–507. 
GLOBAL FAMILY CHANGES 37 
Osterman, M. J. K., & Martin, J. A. (2018). Timing and adequacy of prenatal care in the United 
States, 2016. National Vital Statistics Reports, 67, 1-13. 
Pampel, F. C., Denney, J. T., & Krueger, P. M. (2011). Cross-national sources of health 
inequality: Education and tobacco use in the World Health Survey. Demography, 48, 
653-674. 
Perelli-Harris, B. (2014). How similar are cohabiting and married parents? Second conception 
risks by union type in the United States and across Europe. European Journal of 
Population, 30, 437–464. 
Pesando, L. M., & the GFC team. (in press). Global family change: Persistent diversity with 
development. Population and Development Review. 
Pew Research Center. (2018). Social media use continues to rise in developing countries, but 
plateaus across developed ones. Retrieved from http://www.pewglobal.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2018/06/Pew-Research-Center-Global-Tech-Social-Media-Use-
2018.06.19.pdf 
Raymo, J. M., Park, H., Xie, Y., & Yeung, W. J. (2015). Marriage and family in East Asia: 
Continuity and change. Annual Review of Sociology, 41, 471-492. 
Reardon, S. F. (2011). The widening academic achievement gap between the rich and the poor: 
New evidence and possible explanations. In G. J. Duncan & R. J. Murnane (Eds.), 
Whither opportunity (pp. 91–116). New York: Russell Sage. 
Rindfuss, R. R., Choe, M. K., & Brauner-Otto, S. R. (2016). The emergence of two distinct 
fertility regimes in economically advanced countries. Population Research and Policy 
Review, 35, 287–304. 
GLOBAL FAMILY CHANGES 38 
Rowland, D. T. (2007). Historical trends in childlessness. Journal of Family Issues, 28, 1311–
1337. 
Ruggles, S., & Heggeness, M. (2008). Intergenerational coresidence in developing countries. 
Population and Development Review, 34, 253–281.  
Sassler, S., & Miller, A. J. (2011). Class differences in cohabitation processes. Family Relations, 
60, 163-177. 
Schneider, D., Hastings, O. P., & LaBriola, J. (2018). Income inequality and class divides in 
parental investments. American Sociological Review, 83, 475–507. 
Schwartz, C. R., & Han, H. (2014). The reversal of the gender gap in education and trends in 
marital dissolution. American Sociological Review, 79, 605–629. 
Seltzer, J. A. (2004). Cohabitation in the United States and Britain: Demography, kinship, and 
the future. Journal of Marriage and Family, 66, 921–928. 
Seltzer, J. A., Bachrach, C. A., Bianchi, S. M., Bledsoe, C. H., Casper, L. M., Chase-Lansdale, 
P.. Thomas, D. (2005). Explaining family change and variation: Challenges for family 
demographers. Journal of Marriage and Family, 67, 908–925. 
Shorter, E. (1977). The making of the modern family. New York:  Basic Books. 
Smeeding, T. (2006). Poor people in comparative perspective. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 20, 69–90. 
Stevenson, B., & Wolfers, J. (2007). Marriage and divorce: Changes and their driving forces. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(2), 27–52. 
Stone, L. (1977). The family, sex and marriage in England 1500–1800. New York: Harper & 
Row 
GLOBAL FAMILY CHANGES 39 
Surkyn, J., & Lesthaeghe, R. (2004). Value orientations and the Second Demographic Transition 
(SDT) in Northern, Western and Southern Europe: An update. Demographic Research, 
3(3), 45–86. 
Taylor, H. O., Taylor, R. J., Nguyen, A. W., & Chatters, L. (2018). Social isolation, depression, 
and psychological distress among older adults. Journal of Aging and Health, 30, 229–
246. 
Therborn, G. (2004). Between sex and power: Family in the world, 1900–2000. London: 
Routledge. 
Thomson, E. (2014). Family complexity in Europe. Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, 654, 245–258.  
Thornton, A. (2001) The developmental paradigm, reading history sideways, and family change, 
Demography, November 2001, 38,  4, 449–465. 
Thornton, A., & Young-DeMarco, L. (2004). Four decades of trends in attitudes towards family 
issues in the United States: The 1960s through the 1990s. Journal of Marriage and 
Family, 63, 1009–1037. 
Thornton, A., & Philipov, D. (2009). Sweeping changes in marriage, cohabitation, and 
childbearing in Central and Eastern Europe: New insights from the developmental 
idealism framework. European Journal of Population, 25, 123–156.  
Thornton, A., Pierotti, R. A., Young-DeMarco, L., & Watkins, S. (2014). Developmental 
idealism and cultural models of the family in Malawi. Population Research and Policy 
Review, 33, 693–716. 
Upchurch, D. M., Lillard, L. A., & Panis, C. W. A. (2002). Nonmarital childbearing: Influences 
of Education, Marriage, and Fertility. Demography, 39, 311-329. 
GLOBAL FAMILY CHANGES 40 
Van de Kaa, D. J. (1987). Europe's second demographic transition. New York: Population 
Reference Bureau. 
Watkins, S. C. (1990). From local to national communities: The transformation of demographic 
regimes in Western Europe, 1870–1960. Population and Development Review, 16, 241–
272. doi:10.2307/1971590 
Weber, M., Baehr, P., & Wells, G. C. (2002). The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism 
and other writings. Location?: Penguin Publishing Group. 
Wilson, C. (2001). On the scale of global demographic convergence 1950–2000. Population and 
Development Review, 27, 155–171. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2001.00155.x 
Wilson, C. (2011). Understanding global demographic convergence since 1950. Population and 
Development Review, 37, 375–388. 
Yamamoto, Y., & Sonnenschein, S. (2016). Family contexts of academic socialization: The role 
of culture, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status. Research in Human Development, 13, 
183–190. 
Yount, K. M. (2009). Women’s “justification” of domestic violence in Egypt. Journal of 
Marriage and Family, 71, 1125–1140. 
  
GLOBAL FAMILY CHANGES 41 
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